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CLASSIFICATION

TO Chief of Mission, Frankfurt

DATE: NOV 2 1953

FROM Chief, SR

ATTN: REBOX/MUNICH

INFO: REBOX/Frankfurt

SUBJECT: GENERAL: REBOX/AEQUOR

SPECIFIC: Expansion and Exploitation of Existing Operational Facilities

1. The prospect of recruiting, training and dispatching an AEQUOR Team III in 1954 makes it necessary to appraise the AEQUOR effort thus far and formulate plans for the expansion of AEQUOR in the realization of the original project objectives. However, the dispatch of a new AEQUOR team merely for the sake of having an operational dispatch does not reflect current thinking. A blind drop is definitely discouraged and any suggestions of a blind drop would be disapproved. It is, therefore, imperative that the control status or cleanliness of the AEQUOR Team II be established satisfactorily to form a base from which training of the new AEQUOR team could be projected.

2. The original project as approved in 1951 proposed to:

a. Spot, recruit, assess and train agent personnel for infiltration into the Byelorussian SSR.

b. Contact and exploit any existing Byelorussian resistance movements for the procurement of intelligence on specific targets, recent events in Byelorussia and procure operational and strategic intelligence.

c. Establish support facilities required for agent operations into Byelorussia.

3. Generally, by basing the evaluation of the project on the actual August 1952 dispatch, the position of the team inside the Byelorussian SSR and the production of marginal intelligence, it would be plausible to conclude that some of the objectives have been achieved.

Removed from Project AEQUOR

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4. RIS Control: The extenuating circumstances encountered by the ARQUON Team II and the irregularities in the mechanics of the W/T traffic have raised the question of Soviet control. Because of this doubt, it is the intention of headquarters to pose a series of intelligence-type control questions, coordinated with our requirements people, to Camposantos 6, 8 and 9 regarding W/T traffic and in whatever S/W contacts are activated. This combined effort may divulge informational discrepancies which would tend to abate or substantiate our reservations on the subject of RIS control. Until such time that the problem can be resolved satisfactorily either way, the factor of Soviet control must remain a constant in all proposed operational thinking and planning.

5. Project Appraisal:

A. Spot, recruit, assess and train agent personnel

a. This facet of the project objectives was realized with the dispatch of Camposantos 4, 6, 8 and 9 in August 1952 as ARQUON Team II.

B. Contact and exploit any existing Byelorussian resistance movements

a. According to the W/T traffic, the team has not been successful in locating any form of group resistance, which they maintain does not exist. They did note, however, that in their opinion the activism which did exist was limited to isolated individuals living black.

b. The two individuals, who for the sake of convenience have been labelled 'partisans', put in contact with Camposantos 8 and 9 may provide an opportunity for expansion by the incorporation and utilization of their legal contacts other than those already encountered by the Camposantos.

c. Although the production of positive intelligence has been negligible, this portion of the operation can be viewed as fairly successful in that the ARQUON Team II was not trained to serve as an intelligence-gathering unit.

C. Establish support facilities required for agent penetration into Byelorussia

a. If the team is clean, the people befriended by the Camposantos, both legal and illegal, offer excellent opportunities for support functions. They could be of assistance in the planning of a new operation by obtaining document intelligence and providing safe residence and medical facilities. The utilization of this information by ARQUON Team III, however, would be considered only after the status of ARQUON Team II has been established.

6. Recommendations:

A. The ARQUON operation has divided, quite naturally, into two sections. One section includes that group of legals known to Camposanto 6 in the HAPANOVICHKI area; the other centers about the group in the LAMEN area known to Camposantos 8 and 9. If we are to capitalize upon this convenient division, Camposanto 6 must activate an independent method of communication, namely

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his S/W channel. Therefore it is important that Camposanto 6 inform us through the W/T contact of his ability to send and receive mail. If he can post a letter with comparative ease, we would then await Camposanto 6's mail contact with the outside. Upon the receipt of the letter, we would initiate contact through mail drop facilities in the USSR and attempt to furnish Camposanto 6 with addresses to complete the cycle. If Camposanto 6 cannot receive intra-USSR mail, then it may be necessary to utilize his established legal contacts, whom it may be assumed, would be in a position to receive correspondence. With the inauguration of the S/W communication channel, it would be possible to isolate Camposanto 6 and have him devote his efforts to the KARNOVICH OBLAST. The question of a mail contact will be restated to Camposanto 6 in ensuing W/T traffic to hasten the assessment and feasibility of the secondary communication channel.

B. Some thought has been given to the possibility of exfiltrating one or two members of the ABQUON team II plus, and indigenous contact for a thorough debriefing on contemporary document intelligence, operational intelligence, travel and living conditions. Although, at the present time, no one person has been singled out for the exfiltration, Camposanto 6 and 8 appear to be the most likely prospects with Camposanto 9 remaining as the link to the target area. It will be suggested that prior to any operational travel, Camposanto 6 take an exploratory trip to some point in the Karelo-Finnish SSR. This trip, under the guise of a rest trip or if necessary a temporary contract labor job, should acquaint Camposanto 6 with the eventualities encountered in making a legal trip, specifically noting dead drop facilities and documentation requirements. The trip should not take more than two weeks and would provide a solid framework in which the exfiltration could be planned.

C. If, by the end of the summer 1954, Soviet control of ABQUON Team II has been substantiated, the ABQUON Team III will not be dispatched. If, however, the ensuing cross-checking as outlined in this dispatch, reveals that team II is not controlled and the intelligence production has been satisfactory, the question of interdependency of Teams II and III will be resolved at that time.

Until then however, ABQUON Team II will be requested to transmit document and operational intelligence to insure the preparedness and success of ABQUON Team III in its mission.

D. A more comprehensive utilization of the present ABQUON team is being contemplated. As outlined in paragraph 5 (A), the division of ABQUON Team II should enhance the intelligence-gathering potential of Team II. Camposanto 6 is dependent on Camposanto 8 and 9 for communication only. It is hoped that with the institution of S/W, this problem will be negated, thereby covering the interdependency of the two units and placing Camposanto 6 in a position to exploit his witting legals as intelligence sources. Specifically, then, Camposanto 6 could attempt to exploit his contacts in MOVDNIPOK, BOD-BASKA, KARNOVICH and obtaining intelligence

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peculiar to that location, while Components 8 and 9 could capitalize on their witting contacts in VOLOKHIN, BORISOVKA, NALIBOKI, making it possible to expand the intelligence production of the team in two directions simultaneously. Requirement for these areas would include a freight car count; axels; specific types of freight; ground OS; location, description, title, aim, curricula of any military schools; identification of units in city; identification of any units under command of the Military District, Army or Corps HQ plus Personnel and equipment strength in the city. Other specific requirements would be coordinated with the responsible parties.

7. The operational planning discussed in this dispatch is for your guidance and should not be revealed to CAMBISTA 2. If it becomes necessary to consult with CAMBISTA 2 on projected operations, the information contained herewith is to be disclosed only if it would further the particular topic.

Should CAMBISTA 2 express concern over our stress on intelligence activities he should be told that:

- a. Our experience has definitely shown that the only effective method of determining control is to ask intelligence-type questions, and,
- b. If the Byelarusians expect us to aid them in their cause, it is imperative that a steady flow of intelligence be developed to cope with Soviet tactics.

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MR:hob (14 October 1953)

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